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ARGUMENT PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION 
This is an appeal from a conviction in a criminal 
matter not involving the death penalty and is priortiy 
No. 2. 
JURISDICTION OP THE COURT OP APPEALS 
Jurisdictional authority is conferred upon the 
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(e) 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended. 
NATURE OP THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Defendant was charged by criminal information 
with the third-degree felony of Theft. Trial without a 
jury was had before the Honorable George E. Ballif, 
District judge, in the Fourth District Court for 
Millard County. The Defendant was found guilty as 
charged, sentenced, and now appeals the conviction. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
ISSUE ONE: Evidence obtained by promise of 
immunity from prosecution was Im-
properly admitted, over objection. 
ISSUE TWO: The criminal act charged was com-
mitted when the Defendant was act-
ing under compulsion. Notice of, 
and proof of such compulsion was 
submitted but the defense was re-
jected by the Trial judge. 
ISSUE THREE: value of the stolen property was 
determined after the value was 
enhanced by work and transporta-
tion by the Defendant, and was 
never as in the place and condi-
tion possessed by the owner at the 
time of taking; thus, proof of 
value failed, and a finding of 
guilt was improper. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following provisions of the Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, apply and are determinative 
to the case: 
76-2-302 (copy of code) 
76-6-412 (1) (b) (i) (copy of code) 
77-22-3 (copy of code) 
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STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
On February 18, 1987, the defendant and a 
companion by the name of Darin Brailsford were 
apprehended at the construction site of the 
Intermountain Power Project located in Millard County/ 
Utah* (T 39) They had gone to the project site to steal 
scrap copper wire being stored inside the secured 
project compound. (T 39) Following their apprehension, 
the defendant and Brailsford were questions by officers 
representing the Millard County Sheriff's Department. 
The officers made promises of no prosecution in 
exchange for a waiver of the right against self 
incrimination and a truthful disclosure of the facts 
incident to the theft investigation. (T 77) The 
defendant talked, gave details of a prior theft, 
including the name of the company to whom the scrap 
copper wire had been sold. (T 78) The officers, using 
the information provided by the defendant, went to the 
salvage company, Wasatch Metal h Salvage, and obtained 
a business receipt pertaining to the sale of scrap 
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copper and signed by Darin Brailsford. (Plaintifffs 
Exhibit No. 1) 
Contrary to the no-prosecution representation, an 
Information was filed charging the defendant with the 
theft of scrap copper covered by the receipt above 
referred to. The defendant filed a motion to suppress 
the confession taken, and, in addition, gave notice of 
the defense of compulsion. It was the defendant's 
contention that his friend, Brailsford, was being 
threatened with serious bodily injury, loss of 
property, and perhaps even death if he did not pay 
money. The only way to speedily raise the money to 
prevent such injury and loss was to assist Brailsford, 
at his request, in the copper thefts. (T 71) This 
defense was considered by the Court and rejected. 
During the trial, by the only evidence introdued 
by plaintiff, the copper was given a value at the scrap 
market price paid in Salt Lake County by Wasatch Metal 
& Salvage company, and shown on the receipt referred to 
above, (T 22-23) which was given as plaintiff's exhibit 
No, 1 at the trial, and admitted over defendant's 
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objection. (T 24) The defendant contended that the 
value of the goods stolen, for the purpose of 
determining the degree of theft committed, was that of 
the copper in the hands of its owner in Millard County 
and at the time of the theft, and that the value shown 
on the receipt and the amount paid by Wasatch Metal & 
Salvage Company represented a value enhanced by the 
removal of the insulation, the loading, the 
transportation of the scrap copper from Millard County 
to Salt Lake County. (T 87-88) And, that since the 
State failed to introduce any value of the stolen 
copper at the Millard County site while in the owner's 
possesion, the proof failed. This argument was 
rejected. (T 90) 
prior to trial, the defendant waived his rights to 
trial by jury, and elected a trial to the bench. 
(Transcript of Hearing dated April 1, 1987) A primary 
purpose for such determination was the question of 
suppression of the confession obtained from the 
defendant at the time of his apprehension, referred to 
above. And the hearing on the question of suppression 
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was to be a part of the trial process. The defendant 
objected to the admissibility of the receipt obtained 
from Wasatch Metal & Salvage Company, but such receipt 
was admitted. The defendant was convicted and sentenced 
to serve a term in prison, and now takes this appeal, 
requesting that his conviction be set aside and the 
case dismissed. The appeal is based upon three points 
wherein the defendant contends the Trial judge 
committed error: 
1. The Court allowed the admission of exhibit No. 
1, the receipt secured through information obtained by 
a confession which was induced by a promise of no 
prosecution. 
2. The Court failed to properly consider the 
evidence offered in support of the defense of 
compulsion. 
3. There was no proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the value of the stolen proeprty, at the time it 
was taken and in the condition of the property while in 
the owner's possession, was in the amounts required for 
conviction of a third-degree felony theft. 
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SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
ISSUE ONE: A confessionf or evidence obtained 
through use of the confession, obtained by a promise of 
no-prosecution, is inadmissible during the trial of a 
defendant on charges to which he has given the 
confession. 
ISSUE TWO: The defense of compulsion is provided 
by statute, and the Court should apply reasonable 
standards in considering the applicability of such a 
defense to the case in question and the evidence 
tendered. 
ISSUE THREE: The value to be assigned to stolen 
property in determining if a crime has been committed 
or the degree of such a crime, is the value of the 
stolen property in possession of the owner at the time 
of the theft, and cannot include value added by the 
accused. And, if no such value is proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the case should be dismissed. 
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DETAIL OP ARGUMENT 
ISSUE ONE: The confession to the crime for which 
conviction was had, was taken and induced by a promise 
of no-prosecution. (T 77) This promise was made by the 
investigating officer, and there was no proof that he 
was authorized to grant such immunity by the County 
Attorney. The County Attorney can grant such immunity, 
as provided by Section 77-22-3 U.C.A. 1953 as amended. 
However, if the offer is made and the defendant 
responds, and then prosecution is instituted, the State 
cannot take advantage of their deception. They can 
prosecute, but they cannot use as a part of their trial 
evidence, the confession obtained, nor any evidence 
obtained through the use of the confession. This 
position was clearly established by the Utah Supreme 
Court in the case of State vs. Ward, (Utah 1977,) 571 
P.2d 1343. In this case, the defendant was granted 
immunity by a Deputy County Attorney, without 
authorization from the County Attorney. A confession 
was obtained including some deliberate 
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misrepresentation. Proseution was instituted. The 
defense moved to quash the information in the trial 
Court based upon the proffered immunity. The motion was 
granted and the State appealed. The Supreme Court 
reversed upon the basis that only the County Attorney 
could grant immunity, and hence, the grant from the 
deputy was ineffectual. However, the Court made the 
following comments concerning the confession and 
evidence obtained thereby: 
"In view of the conclusion we have arrived 
at, we think that fairness to the defend-
ant and the interests of justice require 
us to state that in this case the prose-
cution should not be entitled to rely on 
npr to make use of any confession or any 
other evidence whatsoever they have ob-
tained by reason of what we now deter-
mine to be an invalid grant of immunity. 
But this case should in effect revert 
to the status it was in prior to such 
purported grant of immunity for whatever 
investigation or other disposition may be 
made of it without such qrant of 
immunity." 
That same reasoning applies in this case. Although 
the State determined at trial that they would not offer 
the defendant's confession into evidence, they did 
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offer, and the Trial judge admitted into evidence, the 
receipt issued by Wasatch Metal and Salvage Company for 
the purchase of the goods from the theives. This 
receipt was marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1. This 
receipt was secured by the State through a follow up on 
the information secured from the defendant through his 
confession. The admission into evidence was in error. 
The effect of the error was substantial. This was the 
only hard evidence of the crime prosecuted. 
ISSUE TWO: The defendant maintained that his act 
of theft was not done for personal gain, but to aid a 
friend, Darin Brailsford, who was under threat of 
death, serious bodily harm, and property loss, the 
threats being made by one Roger Garth Bott. Based upon 
the testimony at trial, this Bott was also a copper 
theif, and had gone to the Power Project site at a time 
prior to the incident resulting in the defendant's 
charges. At the time Bott was at the site, he removed 
scrap copper from the security compound, placed the 
same next to a roadway in preparation for loading and 
transporting. Before he could return with his vehicle 
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to complete the loading and removal of the stolen 
goods, Brailsford and an associate (not the defendant) 
found the stolen scrap copper conveniently placed along 
the roadside, loaded it into their vehicle, and hauled 
it away. Bott discovered the matter, and demanded of 
Brailsford payment of $900.00. He fortified his demand 
with threats of property damage, bodily injury, or 
death. Brailsford determined that the most accessible 
and possibly the only immediate source of such money to 
meet the demand and avoid the threatened danger, was 
the securing and sale of scrap copper with which he was 
familiar, and he sought the help of the defendant. 
Brailsford, and the associate who was also involved in 
taking the Bott copper, explained to the defendant 
their plight, the threats received, and the physical 
injuries already suffered to body and property. The 
defendant made some inquiry of law enforcement 
officials as to possible help availble, but received no 
answer which satisfactorily resolved the apprehension 
of danger. And, thus, the defendant maintains that he 
acted only out of a motive to assist a friend, 
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Brailsford, a third person, who was in imminent danger 
of property damage, bodily injury, and/or death. The 
defenses to criminal reponsibility provided by Utah law 
include the defense of compulsion. Section 76-2-302 (1) 
U.C.A. 1953 as amended provides as follows: 
"A person is not guilty of an offense when 
he engaged in the proscribed conduct be-
cause he was coerced to do so by the use 
or threatened imminent use of unlawful 
physical force upon him or a third person, 
which force or threatened force a person 
of reasonable firmness in his situation 
would not have resisted." 
This section has been interpreted by our Supreme 
Court, several times, and in the cases of STATE v. 
HARDING (Utah 1981) 635 P.2d 33, and STATE v. TUTTLE 
(Utah 1986) 730 P.2d 630, the following relevant 
guidelines have been adopted: 
1. Imminent, unlawful force means that which will 
occur presently and will cause substantial bodily 
injury. 
2. The threat must be specific. 
3. There can be no reasonable, legal alternative 
to violating the law. 
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In the case at hand, we have extensive records of 
the acts and tiroes upon which the defendant relies to 
establish the defense of compulsion. This testimony 
comes from Darin Brailsford, the friend who was 
threatened. See pages 43 through 47 of the Trial 
transcript and the testimony of the defendant in pages 
70 through 73 of the Trial transcript. All such pages 
are found in the Addendum section of this Brief. 
A person of reasonable firmness, if found in 
defendant's situation, would do as the defendant did to 
protect his friend. The defendant believed that if he 
did not act, his friend would suffer injury and 
possibly death. This Court is now being asked to review 
the facts and the statutory provision, consider the 
reasoning of the Trial Court, and then set reasonable 
application of the statute, which defendant believes 
will lead to the conclusion that the Trial judge failed 
to properly apply the law to the compulsion defense, 
the Appeal Court finding rather that the defense of 
Compulsion has been proven; and, consequently, the 
conviction should be vacated and the case dismissed. 
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ISSUE THREE: This issue is a question of proof as 
to value. The statute. Section 76-6-412 (1) (b) (i) 
U.C.A. 1953 as amendedf provides that theft is a 
third-degree felony if the property stolen had a value 
of more than $250.00 but not more than $1,000.00. Scrap 
copper was stolen. The value which must be proved is 
how much it was worth when and at the location stolen. 
The only evidence offered by the State was the price 
paid by Wasatch Metal and Salvage Company in Salt Lake 
County, over one hundred miles from the site, at a 
location where there was a market for scrap copper, and 
after the insulation had been removed from the copper. 
This all required investment in the copper of man 
power, equipment, and supplies. This all enhanced the 
value of the copper. The price paid in Salt Lake County 
may have been a fair value at that place and 
considering the then condition of the scrap copper, but 
that was not the value necessary to be proven in this 
case. The value at the owner's location, in the owner's 
condition was less than the value in Salt Lake County. 
How much less, we do not know. The State bears the 
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burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt. No such proof was offered. 
Consequently, the conviction should be reversed and the 
case dismissed. 
The following code provisions and cases apply and 
support the above conclusion: 
76-6-101 (4) (a) D.C.A. 1953 as amended. 
(4) "Value" means: 
(a) The market value of the property, if 
totally destroyed, at the time and 
place of the offense, or where cost 
of replacement exceeds the market 
value. 
STATE v. LOGAN (Utah 1977) 563 P.2d 811, where the 
Court said: 
"The measure of value is its fair market 
value at the time and place where the 
alleged crime was committed." 
STATE v. CARTER (Utah 1985) 707 P.2d 650, where 
the Court said: 
"One test is the market value of the 
property; that is, the price a well-
informed buyer would pay to a well-
informed seller where neither is 
obliged to enter into the transaction," 
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"To prove market value in a different 
city, the cities must be sufficiently 
close geographically and similar in 
population to be considered the sarnie 
place for the purpose of valuing the 
property.w 
CONCLUSION 
The conviction of the defendant on the 
third-degree felony charge of Theft should be reversed 
and the case dismissed. Evidence important to the 
conviction was inadmissible, consisting of a purchase 
receipt for stolen goods, which receipt was obtained 
through an unauthorized grant of immunity. The defense 
of compulsion was raised and proven, the defendant not 
acting for* personal gain, but only to protect his 
friend who was under imminent threat and danger of 
bodily injury and death. And, finally, no proof of the 
value of the stolen property, showing value in the 
place, condition, and at the time taken, was presented 
to the Court during the trial. For these reasons, the 
conviction should be reversed and the case dismissed. 
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Respectfully submitted this 
January, 1988. 
J^ y% day of 
MILTOW T. BARMON 
Attorney for the Defendant-Appellant 
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Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
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MILTOtt T . HARMON 
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ADDENDUM 
Attached hereto are copies of Trial transcript 
pages 43, 44, 4*5, 46, 47, 70, 71, 72, and 73, and the 
following provisions of Dtah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended: 
76-2-302 
76-6-101 (4) (a) 
76-6-412 (1) (b) (i) 
77-22-3 
I 
I 
I 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
H 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A Yes, he did. 
Q What did he tell you about that? 
A He said that I took his wire--well/ he really 
didn't say that. He beat up one of my friends first; and 
chased me around my truck and I headed down and told 
Terry Fullerton that I took his copper wire, that I owed hi t;« 
.'JOO.00, or that he was going to shatter out the front window 
of my truck. 
Q And did you understand, then, that the wire that 
you had found thrown over the fence, had been wire that bctt 
had thrown over the fence and you had taken it? 
A Yes. 
Q And he felt he was out that money, and he wanted 
ycu to pay him back for that? 
A Yes. 
Q And if you didn't pay him back, what was gcinj 
to happen to you? 
A Terry said that he would kill me. 
Q Did Mr. Bott do something to your truck at that 
t i me t 
A No, he didn't--yes, he did. He kicked my truck 
by the gas tank and put footprints in it. They are still 
there. 
Q Was the windshield broken out of your truck? 
A Yes, it was. 
43 
Did he do that? 
NO/ he didn't. 
Do you know who did that? 
Deno. 
Was he working with Mr. Bott? 
I guess. I don't know for sure. 
And one of your friends was beaten up? 
Yes. 
Who was that? 
Ron Cox. 
He's the fellow that went with you on this first 
Yes. 
Was he threatened in a similar manner as you 
Yes. 
And that is, if you didn't pay Garth Bott the 
they were going to cause you serious injury, is tha 
Yes. They didn't tell me personally, but they 
ry Fullerton and them. 
Did you believe that message? 
Yes. 
Did you have any way of getting $900.00 to give 
Bott? 
I 
2 
S 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A No. 
Q You weren't working? 
A No. 
Q Could you go to your parents? 
A No. 
Q Why didn't you go to the police and tell them 
abcut this threat? 
A I don't know. I was scared; I guess. 
Q Were you worried about the fact that you had 
otolen this wire? 
A Yes. 
0 Who did you turn to for help/ then? 
A All my friends. 
Q Did that include the defendant, Robert Ott? 
A Yes, it did. 
Q Did you tell him about the threats that had been 
made to you? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Did you try to convince him that if he didn't 
help you, that you may get killed, or that your truck may 
get damaged? 
A Yes. 
Q Were you able to convince him of that? 
MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, I'm going to object 
to this line of questioning. I don't think it's material 
45 
1 to this particular case/ as far as Mr. Ott is concern*-j. 
2 THE COURT: I'm going to hea£ it. It may hive 
3 something to do with his intent. 
4 MR. BRAILSFORD: What was thdi question again? 
5 Q (By Mr. Harmon) Well/ let met go on. So f >r aj 
6 you know/ were you able to convince Mr. Qtt that if ho didn't 
1 help you/ that something would happen to you? 
8 A Yes. 
9 J MR. ANDERSON: I object to that line of question-
10 ' ing. I think it's a leading question and it's not mat(rial. 
11 It's asking for a conclusion on this witness's part/ y<ur 
12 Honor. 
13 THE COURT; Rephrase the question again, will 
14 you, Mr. Harmon. 
15 Q (By Mr. Harmon) Were you satisifed that Mr. Oft 
16 was convinced/ from your conversation with him, that if he 
17 (didn't help you; something serious wonlA happen to you, 
19 physically? 
19 
20 
21 
22 
24 
24 
25 
A Yes. 
MR. ANDERSON: I still objetft to the question. 
THE COURT: This is Cross Examination, 
Mr. Anderson. 
MR. ANDERSON: I know, but KF* ' s asking this 
witness to decide what Mr. Ott had concluded in his own mind. 
THE COURT: Well, he's the man that made the 
46 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
request. He talked to him. I'll hear his testimony. ! 
realize it's an opinion. The answer was "Yes"? 
MR. BRAILSFORD: Yes. 
Q (By Mr. Harmon) So far as- yon know, is thAt the 
reason that Mr. Ott went with you, to get ttie wire? 
A Yes. 
0. It wasn't because you were going to pay him any 
money? 
A That too. 
THE COURT: What do you nie'an by "That too"? 
MR. BRAILSFORD: I told hi hi i f he would help me 
out, I would give him a hundred dollars, and I would hv;e 
to keep the rest because I would have to pay off Gatth Bott, 
and he understood that. 
Q (By Mr. Harmon) So when you asked him to help 
you, you told him about the threat--
A — Y e s . 
Q --And you also told him that you would give him 
A hundred dollars? 
A Yes. 
MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor/ for the recotd, there 
has been a Notice of a Compulsion ot defense filed in this 
case by Mr. Ott. We take the positiofl that this testimony 
would not be relevant to that defense as compulsion. What 
might happen— 
47 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
THE COURT: You understand that, Mr. Ot"t, th-it 
you don't have to testify in this matter? 
MR. OTT: Yes, I do, sir. 
THE COURT: You do want to testify, however? 
MR. OTT: Yes sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Come forward and be 
sworn. 
ROBERT CHARLES OTT, having been, called as a 
10 J witness, and having been first duly sworn to tell the truth, 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
13 
19 
20 
21 
2! 
23 
24 
2S 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MILTON T. HARMON: 
Q Your true and correct name is Charles Robert Ott? 
A Robert Charles Ott. 
Q Robert Charles Ott? 
A Yes. 
Q And you're the defendant in this case? 
A I am. 
Q Now, did you accompany Mr. Brailsford, Mr. Ivie 
and Mr. Case to the Intermountain Power Project site early 
in February of 1987? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Could you tell us why you went down there? 
70 
1 
2 
i 
4 
5 
6 
1 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
A Because I heard of the trouble that 
Mr. Brailsford was in. 
Q Who told you about that? 
A Him and Terry Fullerton. 
Q And when did they tell you about that trouble? 
A It was a day that Darin's windshield was smashed 
in. 
Q How many days was that before you went to the 
site? 
A It was approximately two. 
Q And as Mr. Fullerton and Mr. Brailsford came to 
you, tell us what they advised you? 
A They pulled up in the yard, and as they pulled 
up# I walked outside and I noticed that the entire windshield 
on Darin's truck was shattered. And they told me the story 
that they went out and had taken Garth's copper/ and that 
Garth had chased Darin around and threatened to beat him up, 
after he had already beat up Ron Cox. And then his 
windshield was smashed. 
Q And was there any indication made to you that 
Mr. Brailsford was worried that if he didn't pay something 
*
2
 |to Mr. Bott/ that he would be injured? 
23 
24 
25 
A Yes. 
MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, I'm going to object 
jto this. I don't think it's relevant to these issues, even ] 
M as to the issue of compulsion. 
2
 THE COURT: I'm going to hear the testimony, in 
* j any event. Go ahead/ Mr. Harmon. 
* Q (By Mr. Harmon) Tell us what was told you to 
5 with regard to those threats? 
6
 A Well/ they came into the house and they told me 
7
 that Darin had taken Garth's copper/ and that if it wasn't 
* I paid back/ Garth was going to kill Darin. 
' Q Did you believe them? 
10 A Yes/ I did. 
H Q Now, after you heard this story/ did you make 
12 any contact with the Provo City Police Department? 
13 A Yes. I made an anonymous phone call. 
1* Q And what was the purpose of that phone call? 
15 A I was trying to find an angle as to where—there 
1* had to be more stealing but/ at the same time/ I couldn't 
*
7
 explain the full situation without implicating Darin in the 
18
 | theft. 
*
9
 Q Were you seeking some help to prevent Mr. Bott 
i 0
 I from hurting Mr. Brailsford? 
A I was attempting to, yes. 2) 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q With regard to that/ were you advised that they 
couldn't do anything until the assault or crime had actually 
occurred? 
A Yes. That's what I was told. 
Q Now, with that information, then, what did you 
determine that you should do with regard to Mr. Brailsford? 
A I felt I had to help him. 
Q And why did you feel that way? 
A Because he was a friend of mine, and I didn't 
feel it was right that he should be hurt over something that 
was stolen. 
Q Did he offer you money if you would help him? 
A He was told that after he paid off Garth, what 
was left over/ would be divided among everybody. 
Q Did you help him because of the money? Is that 
your motive for going there and helping him? 
A No, it wasn't. 
Q What was your motive in helping him? 
A To help pay off Garth. 
Q And why did you want to do that? 
A To keep him from getting hurt and to put an end 
to the trouble between them. 
Q Did you have any feelings that if you didn't help 
him, something would happen to him? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Was there any particular need in your life to 
go out and steal something to earn money? 
A No, there wasn't. 
0 Were you getting along all right, then? 
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76-2-302. Compulsion,—(1) A person is not guilty of an offense wh?n 
he engaged in the proscribed conduct because lie was coerced to do so by 
the uso or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force upon him 
or a third person, which force or threatened force a person of reasonable 
firmness in his situation would not have resisted. 
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this section shall be un-
available to a person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly places 
himself in a situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to 
duress. 
(.1) A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the presence of her 
husband, to any presumption of compulsion or to any defense of compul-
sion except as in subsection (1) provided. 
76-6-101. Definitions.—For purposes of this chapter: 
(4) "Value" means: 
(a) The market value of the property, if totally destroyed, at the time 
and place of the offense, or where cost of replacement exceeds the market 
value; or 
(b) Where the market value cannot be ascertained, the cost of repair-
ing or replacing the property within a reasonable time following the 
offense. 
(c) If the property damaged has a value that cannot be ascertained 
by the criteria set forth in subsections (a) and (b) above, the property 
shall be deemed to have a value not to exceed $50. 
76-6-412. Theft—Classification of offenses—Action for treble damages 
against receiver of stolen property.—(1) Theft of property and services 
as provided in this chapter shall be punishable as follows: 
(a) As a felony of the second degree if: 
(i) The value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; or 
(ii) The property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; or 
(iii) The actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; 
or 
(iv) The property is stolen from the person of another. 
(b) As a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) The value of the property or services is more than $250 but not 
more than $1,000; or 
(ii) The actor has been twice before convicted of theft of property or 
services valued at $250 or less; or 
(iii) When the property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, 
heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry. 
(c) As a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
more than $100 bat does not exceed $250. 
(d) As a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
$100 or less. 
77-22-3. Imsasmtty granted to wstntss • Rehtsftl 
of witness to testify or aeoshsc* ersouMi * 
Powers traated orosecatiag attorneys hi acfctltioa 
to other powers* 
In any investigation or prosecution of a criminal 
case, the attorney general and any county attorney 
shall have the power to grant transactional immu-
nity from prosecution to any person who is called or 
who is intended to be called as a witness in behalf 
of the state whenever the attorney general or county 
attorney deems that the testimony of such person b 
necessary to the investigation or prosecution of each 
a case. No prosecution shall be instituted aeainst the 
person for any crime -disclosed by nis testimony 
which is privileged under this action, provided that 
should the person-*testify faisery, nothing herein 
contained shall be construed to prevent prosecution 
for perjury: 
If during the Investigation or prosecution a person 
refuses to answer a question(or produce evidence of 
any kind on the ground that he may be incriminated 
thereby, the Attorney issuing tne subpoena may file 
a request in writing-with the district court to which 
the examination is being (.conducted for-an order 
requiring that person to answer the» question or 
produce the evidence requesteoVJiiecourt shall set a 
time for hearing rand order* the person 40 appear 
before the court-to show cause* if any hatha*, why 
the question should not be answered or the evidence 
produced, and the court shall order the question 
answered or the evidence produosd unless k finds 
that to do so would be clearly contrary to the public 
interest, or could subject the witness to A,criminal 
prosecution in,another jurisdiction* <4f the witness 
still refuses to -answer or produce 4he evidence, he 
shall be guilty, of contempt of court >and punished 
accordingly. If the witness compile* with the order 
and he would-have been privileged to withhold the 
answer given *or the evidence produced by bka 
except for this eectfon, that'person shall not, be 
prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture on 
account of any fact or act concerning which, he .was 
ordered to answer^or produce evidence except*he 
may nevertheless-, be prosecuted ~or subjected to 
penalty for any perjury, false swearing or contempt 
committed in answering, failing to answer, or tor 
producing or • failing to produce any evidence in 
accordance with the order. 
The powers specified in this chapter are in addi-
tion to any other powers,granted to the attorney 
general or county attorneys. 
